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Mutually	assured	destruction?	Understanding	the	UK
and	Ireland’s	standoff	over	the	Northern	Irish	border
Time	is	rapidly	running	out	in	the	Brexit	negotiations	and	there	is	still	no	agreement	in	sight	on	the	issue
of	the	Irish	border.	Gavin	Barrett	explains	that	despite	the	ultimatums	emanating	from	each	side,	a	no-
deal	Brexit	would	be	catastrophic	for	both	the	UK	and	Ireland.
Tony	Blair	once	famously	compared	then	British	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron’s	(badly	miscalculated)
threats	of	the	UK	leaving	the	EU	(if	not	given	what	it	wanted)	to	a	film	scene	from	Blazing	Saddles	in
which	the	sheriff	successfully	holds	up	a	whole	town	by	threatening	to	shoot	himself	unless	the	bemused	populace
meets	his	demands.	In	real	life,	the	problem	with	such	a	negotiating	technique,	as	Blair	pointed	out,	is	that	the
response	may	be	‘well,	go	ahead!’.	Blair’s	sage	advice	then	seems	even	more	apt	now.
For	the	Brexit	negotiations	have	been	for	some	time	in	their	own	Blazing	Saddles	phase	–	with	effective	ultimatums
emanating	from	both	directions.	Hence,	Irish	Taoiseach	Leo	Varadkar	has	continuously	implicitly	intimated	that
unless	the	UK	government	adheres	to	its	repeated	promises	of	a	frictionless	border,	matters	could	end	in	a	no-deal
Brexit:	bad	for	the	UK,	bad	for	Ireland,	and	bringing	little	joy	for	the	EU	as	a	whole	(which	might	well	lose	out	on	UK
departure	payments).	Less	Blazing	Saddles,	arguably,	than	Mutually	Assured	Destruction,	since	everyone	bites	the
bullet	if	things	go	wrong,	and	not	just	the	sheriff.	Varadkar,	to	be	fair,	is	motivated	by	two	very	serious	risks	posed	by
a	hard	border:	those	to	peace,	and	those	to	now-flourishing	cross-border	commerce.	He	can	also	point	to	a	done
deal:	December’s	Joint	Report	backstop	commitment	(agreed	by	Theresa	May)	to	avoid	frictionless	borders.
There	is	another	Blazing	Saddles	twist,	however.	Because	while	Varadkar	has	been	insisting	on	frictionless	frontiers,
Theresa	May	has	insisted	equally	vehemently	that	the	UK	will	leave	both	the	customs	union	and	the	single	market	–
yet	still	avoid	any	need	for	checks	on	the	Northern	Ireland	border.	For	long,	May	preferred	the	options	either	of	a
‘customs	partnership’	(involving	the	UK	collecting	EU	tariffs)	or	of	a	technology-reliant	‘MaxFac’	approach.	(Last
week	saw	her	push	partnership	hard	as	the	medium-term	option).	There	is	a	touch	of	the	snake-oil	cure	about	both
options,	however.	Hence	former	UK	civil	service	head	Lord	Kerslake	dismissed	a	partnership	as	domestically
politically	unworkable	–	he	might	have	added	a	bureaucratic	nightmare	–	and	MaxFac	as	technologically	impossible.
Similarly,	neither	the	EU	nor	Ireland	(nor	anyone	else)	really	believes	either	‘solution’	can	produce	a	frictionless
frontier.	Theresa’s	way	(as	Boris	Johnson	has	effectively	admitted	privately)	is	the	way	of	hard	borders.	But	May	has
refused	to	do	seamless	borders	any	other	way	(above	all	in	the	only	way	in	which	this	seems	possible:	by	keeping
the	UK	as	a	whole,	or	else	just	Northern	Ireland,	in	the	Single	Market	and	customs	union).	Effectively,	then,	May	too
is	threatening	the	disaster	of	a	no-deal	for	everyone,	if	she	doesn’t	get	her	way.	Her	economically-suicidal	‘no	deal
better	than	a	bad	deal’	agenda	persists	even	if	it	no	longer	dares	speak	its	name.
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The	result	of	all	of	this	is	a	negotiating	impasse.	In	effect,	we	are	witnessing	a	high-stakes	game	of	political	chicken,
with	the	UK	on	one	side	and	Ireland	and	the	other	27	EU	member	states	ranged	on	the	other.	The	Commission	(with
a	keen	eye	for	encouraging	UK	compromise)	has	noted	some	60	areas	in	which	the	regulatory	structure	for	UK
single	market	access	will	collapse	in	the	event	of	a	no-deal.	It	includes	everything	from	aviation	to	energy,	fisheries,
medicines	and	transport.	The	implication	is	that	without	someone	giving	way,	the	UK	economy	will	be	in	deep	trouble
very	quickly.
Theresa	May,	parliamentarily	dependent	on	the	DUP	and	on	Jacob	Rees-Mogg’s	hardline	Brexiteer	‘European
Research	Group’	faction	(which	opposes	even	her	customs	partnership)	and	presiding	over	a	divided	Cabinet,	looks
short	of	workable	exit	strategies.	Postponing	a	decision	–	the	approach,	as	one	commentator	put	it,	of	a	Macawber
rather	than	a	Machiavelli	–	has	long	been	her	primary	approach.	Last	week,	she	suggested	the	UK	staying	in	the
customs	union	until	beyond	the	December	2020	cut-off	date	for	the	transition	period	until	one	of	her	solutions
becomes	workable.	This	has	at	least	the	advantage	of	novelty	(both	MaxFac	and	partnership	having	already	been
rejected	by	the	EU)	but	ultimately	involves	more	postponement	and	no	finality,	and	may	be	rejected	on	that	basis.
Irish	opposition	leader	Micheál	Martin	and	former	Taoiseach	Bertie	Ahern	earlier	voiced	suspicions	that	there	might
be	an	agenda	in	the	UK’s	waiting	game:	to	force	a	climbdown	by	Ireland	at	the	October	European	Council	if	the
border	then	remained	the	only	missing	piece	of	the	Article	50	agreement	jigsaw.	Recent	predictions	by	David	Davis
of	having	to	wait	until	October	for	agreement	only	fuels	such	suspicions.
Such	a	UK	strategy	might	well	backfire.	Ireland	continues	to	seek	friction-free	borders.	And	EU	institutions	(contrary
to	the	expectations	of	some)	have	backed	Ireland	to	the	hilt,	using	language	that	it	will	be	difficult	to	retreat	from.
European	Council	President	Donald	Tusk	recently	asserted	“if,	in	London,	someone	assumes	that	the	negotiations
will	deal	with	other	issues	first…	my	response	would	be:	Ireland	first.”	Commission	Chief	Negotiator	Michel	Barnier,
in	the	border	town	of	Dundalk	recently,	characterised	himself	as	the	“negotiator	for	Ireland”	and	stipulated	there
“must	not	be	a	hard	border	on	the	island	of	Ireland”.	Other	EU	states	have	also	seemed	disinclined	to	abandon
Ireland,	with,	in	particular,	the	agenda-setting	Germans	and	French	refusing	to	support	May.
Barnier’s	recent	Dundalk/Derry	visit	underlined	the	EU’s	commitment	to	a	frictionless	border	–	and	came	with	a
pointed	warning	from	Barnier	that	without	any,	there	would	be	no	Article	50	deal	–	and	no	transition	deal	either,	as
desperately	needed	as	this	is	by	the	UK	economy.	Varadkar	further	cautioned	the	anticipated	October	deadline	for
an	Article	50	agreement	might	be	missed	if	“real	and	meaningful	progress”	on	the	border	was	not	seen	by	June.	This
has	raised	the	prospect	of	economic	chaos	for	the	UK	by	29	March	next	year.
May	is	in	difficulty.	She	has	no	majority	in	either	the	Lords	or	Commons	to	win	the	upcoming	vote	on	exiting	the
customs	union	(although	she	could	seek	to	solve	this	problem	by	delaying	a	parliamentary	vote	until	after	October).
Yet	any	attempt	by	her	to	give	Ireland	and	the	EU	what	they	demand	(permanent	UK	–	or	at	least	Northern	Irish	–
presence	in	the	customs	union	or	an	equivalent	arrangement,	plus	elements	of	the	single	market)	might	possibly	lose
hardline	Tory	Brexiter	support,	and	precipitate	May’s	downfall.	The	more	customs-union	friendly	Labour	might	not	win
any	subsequent	general	election,	going	by	recent	local	elections.
In	Blazing	Saddles,	the	hold-up	ends	happily.	There	remains	a	real	danger	that	this	will	not	happen	in	this
showdown.	On	the	other	hand,	for	all	the	implicit	threats,	May	now	seems	to	be	scrabbling	for	solutions,	and
Varadkar	is	making	soothing	noises	regarding	building	on	the	customs	partnership	idea.	This	might	indicate	that	the
looming	catastrophe	–	for	all	concerned	–	of	a	no-deal	Brexit	is	making	all	concerned	look	for	excuses	to	reholster
those	side-arms	they	currently	have	pointed	threateningly	at	their	own	heads.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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